



# THE TRIPLE NEXUS IN SOUTH SUDAN

**Learning from Local Opportunities**

Martin Quack and Ralf Südhoff

October 2020

## **Abstract**

South Sudan is a poignant case study for understanding the opportunities as well as the more controversial ideas within the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus. The characteristics of the protracted crisis in the country, its root causes and the long-standing experience with a pragmatic, integrated approach on community level make the Triple Nexus for local actors an interesting way forward. While an integrated Triple Nexus approach poses risks of instrumentalising humanitarian action, humanitarian actors do not perceive humanitarian principles to be in danger in South Sudan. The call for more locally-led humanitarian action and the related localisation processes are further reasons to take the Triple Nexus idea seriously in this context where international agencies can learn from local actors and the latter's capacities. A Triple Nexus approach in South Sudan provides substantial potential given that a series of criteria are met which further CHA research has identified as relevant for analysing in which local contexts the Triple Nexus can result in a helpful overcoming of silos: With local ownership, local capacities, a peace-related UN approach and limited external security interests in place, South Sudan has the potential to become a concrete example of action in the so far rather abstract Triple Nexus debate. However, an identified 'triple donor paradox' might represent a major obstacle to progress, with donors promoting a Triple Nexus approach while keeping budget lines in silos, inflexible and limited.

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## 1. Introduction

Few debates on international cooperation currently generate as much momentum and controversy simultaneously as the discourse around the Triple Nexus. However, the discussion on better cooperation embedded within the framework of a 'Humanitarian-Development-Peace' Nexus remains mostly abstract and theoretical. The lack of analysis and debate on the Triple Nexus from a practical perspective is striking both in German-speaking countries as well as in the international arena.

The Centre for Humanitarian Action (CHA) has therefore dedicated one of its three priority areas in its work plan (2019-2021) to the analysis of the 'Triple Nexus in Practice'. So far CHA has issued an introductory paper (Hövelmann 2020b), a policy brief on the CHA Triple Nexus analysis model (Südhoff et al 2020), while undertaking studies on three very different country settings making them relevant due to their specific as well as representative characteristics: Pakistan (Hövelmann 2020a), Mali (Steinke fortc.) and, with this paper, South Sudan.

Both in the interplay of these three country studies, as well as in its stand-alone analysis, South Sudan is a particularly interesting and yet so far under-exposed example within the Triple Nexus debate:

South Sudan is representative of a multitude of different crises and shocks. Continuous conflict has driven millions of people into a state of poverty and hunger, has reversed developmental gains and made humanitarian needs escalate in cycles. In addition, regular weather disasters like droughts and floods, as well as the high developmental needs resulting from the establishment of South Sudan as an independent state in 2011, have further contributed to the country's millionfold people in need. These humanitarian challenges could only be overturned by obtaining sustainable progress on both peace and development issues – while vice versa the so far predominantly humanitarian response could in theory contribute to faster progress on the development and peace sides by an integrated Nexus approach.

At the same time, in South Sudan the interplay of peace, development and humanitarian issues is far less impacted by external, for example, European security- or migration-related policies, as it can be noticed, for instance, in Mali (Steinke fortc.) or other countries in the Sahel and Mediterranean regions. Moreover, Nexus-relevant policies and agendas are neither heavily impacted by a strong, dominant state compromising civil society actors' space in this field, as, for example, in Nigeria or Pakistan (Hövelmann 2020a).

Figure A:  
Infographic South Sudan.  
Source: Centre for Humanitarian Action.

# SOUTH SUDAN



12 million



60.5% Christianity

32.9% Traditional faiths

6.2% Islam



Juba

Source: Wikipedia



Source: Wikimedia

**1.67 million Internally Displaced People (IDPs)**

Source: ACAPS (2020)

**7.5 million**

people in need

**6.48 million**

people food insecure,  
May-July 2020

**186 out of 189**

Human Development  
Index

Source: ACAPS (2020), UNDP (2020), WFP (2020)

All these facets make South Sudan hypothetically representative and an instructive case study for examining the risks, as well as the opportunities attributed to an integrated Triple Nexus approach.

Hence, in South Sudan the approaches and perspectives of essential local civil society actors have more scope to come into play, including their interaction with international aid organisations, a fairly noncontroversial UN mission, and international donors with limited strategic interests in the country. Besides, the limited pronounced interests of the international community in South Sudan also make it an interesting case to study how this reflects on the common donor rhetoric in favour of an integrated Nexus approach and accordingly needed integrated donor policies, or whether contradictions arise.

All these facets make South Sudan hypothetically representative and an instructive case-study for examining the risks, as well as the opportunities attributed to an integrated Triple Nexus approach:

While the Triple Nexus is not a completely new concept (Mosel and Levine 2014; Macrae 2019; Macrae and Harmer 2004; Kocks et al. 2018), it is rooted since 2016 in two policy approaches which have gathered a lot of momentum: the *New Way of Working*, initiated by the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank (WB), as well as the *Grand Bargain*, a set of commitments to reform the humanitarian system, emerging from the World Humanitarian Summit 2016.

The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus as a policy concept envisions a stronger collaboration and coordination among actors from the fields of development cooperation, humanitarian action and peacebuilding (OECD 2019). With this approach, the international community has identified a need for an interlinked, systemic approach to deal with the overburdened aid system. In times of escalating crises, increasingly protracted conflict, and large numbers of people on the move, the pressure to achieve better outcomes by working in a more integrated, effective and efficient way is high. Recurrent and frequent weather-related disasters, as well as the fact that 80% of humanitarian funding is channeled into regions of protracted conflicts (Churrucá Muguruza 2015, 20), highlight the challenge of dealing simultaneously with recurrent humanitarian emergencies, development backlashes and settings of war and conflict.

At the same time, the Triple Nexus approach and its operationalisation are discussed controversially (DuBois 2020). While some regard it as a long overdue reform to siloed approaches, others see the Triple Nexus as a threat to impartial and neutral humanitarian action. They caution that humanitarian assistance could be politicized by peace or security actors, resulting in a loss of independence as well as impartiality. This, alongside compromising adherence to the core humanitarian principles, could negatively affect the respect of needs-based humanitarian work and their ability to negotiate for access. Similarly, subsuming humanitarian action into broader (state-led) frameworks may risk undermining humanitarian space and principles in contexts where the state or the UN might be perceived as conflicting party.

Most importantly, the implementation and operationalisation of the Triple Nexus in practice as well as the conceptualisation of the 'peace' element remain rather vague. While some organisations are taking a pragmatic lead to implement Triple Nexus projects, neither a common definition of what peace means in these contexts exists, nor of 'peace-related approaches' which range from conflict reconciliation programmes to indirectly related programmes on education, social cohesion or economic opportunities. At times also a blurring of concepts between peacebuilding, security, and stabilization can be noticed: While many civil society actors understand peace as a community-level reconciliation or coherence process, states or donors may take a broader interpretation including security, counterterrorism, and stabilization (Südhoff, Hövelmann, and Steinke 2020).

In short, on a theoretical level the Triple Nexus is associated with great expectation and concern by a wide range of actors, while the debate remains fairly abstract and characterised by vague and diverse understandings and definitions. On a practical level, thus far the discourse is limited and oftentimes evolving around humanitarian-development issues only, which have been discussed for decades in the context of Dual Nexus approaches, while neglecting the 'peace' leg and peace actors' perspectives. This paper intends to make a contribution to closing said gaps by sharing a concrete and particularly relevant country example from South Sudan. The study relies on desk research, secondary literature review as well as interviews and direct observations conducted in South Sudan in October 2019.

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"It is unacceptable for South Sudanese to continue bearing the burden and consequences of this conflict including impunity, rape, severe hunger, displacement and almost complete lack of services."

## 2. Country Background

The Republic of South Sudan gained independence from Sudan following a referendum in 2011. In spite of hosting around 75% of former Sudan's total oil reserves, the country's development needs have been immense from the beginning while it faces considerable humanitarian challenges which have periodically increased since the violent escalation of the domestic conflict in December 2013.

South Sudan's President Salva Kiir accused his former Deputy Riek Machar and Machar's supporters of attempting a coup d'état, and the resulting fighting led to a civil war. After several waves of conflict, a revitalised peace agreement had been signed in 2018 by President Kiir, Deputy Machar and several armed groups. However, crucial issues had not been solved and agreed timelines for its implementation were broken in the follow-up.

In February 2020, the leaders of the two main parties to the conflict agreed on a fragile deal. A national unity government has been formed and a cabinet established. Regarding the conflict about the number and the formation of states, it has been agreed to divide the country into 10 states, two administrative areas and one area with special administrative status, while integrating military forces. However, until September 2020, cabinet meetings have been held irregularly and "almost no movement" on security sector reform had been noted.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, the Transitional National Legislative Assembly has yet to be reconstituted, which is delaying progress on the Constitution.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, local experts like James Okuk from Juba-based think tank Center for Strategic Policy Studies judged: "The revitalization of the peace agreement has not progressed as expected and the two years have been wasted [...]"<sup>4</sup> The Women Monthly Forum, a pressure group of South Sudanese peace advocates criticized: "It is unacceptable for South Sudanese to continue bearing the burden and consequences of this conflict including impunity, rape, severe hunger, displacement and almost complete lack of services".<sup>5</sup> According to observers, ongoing high regional and international pressure will be necessary to implement the agreements (International Crisis Group 2020).

Ongoing conflict and insecurity result in an escalating humanitarian crisis and significantly increasing needs.<sup>6</sup> The legacy of civil war and chronic underdevelopment heavily impact the ability of the new nation to provide basic services and to respond to humanitarian needs, while South Sudan ranks 186 out of the 189 countries on the Human Development Index (UNDP 2019). Many communities are vulnerable to the effects of insecurity, displacement, food shortages and outbreaks of disease. In September 2020, more than 7.5 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance, a level close to what was seen in 2017 when a famine hit the country. Recent flooding affected another 500,000 citizens, while official numbers on COVID-19 cases are fairly low, with 2,578 cases being recorded as of September 2020.<sup>7</sup> However, testing capacity is very limited and the virus produces social stigma, therefore incentives for

Figure B.  
Map South Sudan.  
Source: OCHA 2012.





Map Sources: UNCS, SIM, Natural Earth.  
*The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Map created in Jan 2012.*

It is important to differentiate at least three different levels of conflict which have characterised South Sudan's conflict dynamics for decades.

downplaying cases might play a role in these statistics. Besides, the assumed indirect impacts of the pandemic like "disruption to vaccinations, maternal health services or routine treatments for curable diseases like malaria, diarrhoea and pneumonia will result in a devastating increase in deaths".<sup>8</sup>

At the same time, South Sudan remains "one of the most dangerous places in the world to be an aid worker" and access is often not granted: In 2019, seven aid workers were killed and another 144 evacuated as a result of threats to their security, while aid supplies have been looted on at least 17 occasions.<sup>9</sup>

In sum, the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan is the result of multiple interacting factors, with conflicts being a crucial root cause next to weather-related disasters such as droughts or floods, of which humanitarian action can only alleviate some symptoms. As in other crises, development and peacebuilding efforts are necessary to prevent and address the root causes of humanitarian needs, which raises the question of appropriate linkages in a Triple Nexus approach to bring together actors from humanitarian action, development cooperation and peacebuilding.

To analyse its potential in South Sudan it is key to distinguish various levels of conflicts in the country, as well as the different concepts of peace and security in a Triple Nexus context.

## Levels of conflict in South Sudan

It is important to differentiate at least three different levels of conflict which have characterised (South) Sudan's conflict dynamics for decades. The three levels are inter-linked: what happens at one level can impact on conflict at others. The reputable locally-based *Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility* (CSRF) analyses the three key levels in the following way:

**1. Elite political-military competition over the state:** South Sudan (and Sudan before that) has a history of military contestation for the state. This has created a tendency for zero-sum and militarised politics with shifting alliances between different leaders. The control of the oil fields is a key asset for any faction because they are the main source of income for the state. Political negotiations and international interventions to resolve this conflict over the state have tended to focus on elite level power-sharing. South Sudan's neighbours are heavily affected by the conflicts, while they have political and economic interests in the country and have been involved in South Sudan's conflicts in different ways. Individual aid agencies rarely directly influence this macro level conflict.

**2. Citizen-state conflict:** South Sudan provides few services such as education or health care to its citizens which therefore perceive their state as absent. The local authorities and especially local chiefs serve as their main interface with the state but only a very small percentage of resources reaches the county or community level. People feel that it is necessary to have a community member in a position of power to get access to state resources. Groups which are under-represented in government therefore feel marginalised. In addition, the country's political system suffers from the legacy of antagonism

between different rebel movements – mostly mobilised along ethnic lines – from the independence war. Aid agencies are closely linked to this conflict level because they are often engaged in providing basic services.

**3. Community conflicts over resources:** Many communities in South Sudan are strongly affected by local-level conflicts over resources like water, grazing areas and land. These conflicts are partly fuelled by gender norms that associate masculinity with success in warfare, community defence and cattle raids. Historically, the chiefs were responsible for adjudicating disputes within and between communities. However, their authority has diminished because the traditional forms of justice hardly keep pace with the scale of violence. Furthermore, the chiefs themselves may not be responsive to the needs of different groups and they are not always neutral arbiters as they are politicised or benefit from violence. Community-level conflicts become even more problematic across ethnic lines, especially if they are manipulated by political or military elites. In these cases, community level conflicts can play a critical role in sustaining national level conflict. Aid agencies are often affected by these conflicts in their projects, and vice versa can have an impact on the dynamics depending for example on conflict sensitive programmes and a systematic "Do No Harm" approach' (CSRF 2017, 5–6).

These links between the different levels of conflict were confirmed by research for this article and in interviews with various stakeholders: "There is a conspiracy on those three elements", a UN representative analysed. "We have the conflict on the top level", an INGO leader said, but it is impacting at the community level by enforcing, for example, conflicts over natural resources like water and pastures in land where farming opportunities are already limited. Whilst on the other side, fights along ethnic lines on the community level can feed into the national conflict, and "young people joining forces provide human resources on higher levels."

On the positive side, said interdependence can create both reinforcing conflict dynamics as well as opportunities to break vicious cycles. Accordingly, some actors have the potential to impact on various levels, for example, "churches whose massive coverage can influence this"<sup>10</sup> due to their broadly held legitimacy and relatively low levels of corruption when compared to government authorities on various levels. The same legitimacy is also held by traditional and other religious leaders as well as civil society organisations as they are crucial to "create trust between communities, as well as between government agencies and citizens, and open up space for dialogue and political discourse" on all levels (Maihack and Reuss 2019).

"There is a conspiracy on those three elements."

In order to understand the South Sudan set-up, the role of the UN mission is key.

Looking beyond internal conflict dynamics, South Sudan has a history of foreign engagement related to relief as well as to peace and security. These interventions have mainly addressed the macro-level conflict (Agensky 2019), with the UN and the 'Troika' states (USA, Norway and the former colonial power UK) having been particularly engaged. On the regional level, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda) and the African Union (AU) are exerting their influence. At the same time, major Western donors like the German government have a very small embassy and representation in South Sudan with only four German staff members, limiting its political engagement.

In order to understand the South Sudan set-up, the role of the UN mission is also key. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was established by the Security Council in 2011 with South Sudan's independence (before it was the United Nations Mission in Sudan – UNMIS). UNMISS mandate is "to consolidate peace and security, and to help establish the conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan".<sup>11</sup> In August 2020, it encompassed around 14,000 soldiers, 1,750 police officers as well as around 560 civil experts and staff.<sup>12</sup>

UNMISS' peace and protection mandate proved to be crucial when civil war broke out in December 2013 and many people sought refuge particularly inside the UNMISS bases. These so-called 'Protection of Civilians' (POC) sites probably saved tens of thousands of lives (Briggs 2017). While UNMISS might phase out its POC role in the foreseeable future given the improved security situation, in September 2020 there are still more than 181,000 civilians living in POC sites.<sup>13</sup>

Moreover, today UNMISS is acting as a peace mediator, by engaging in projects and negotiations, as well as a donor in its relatively new role in coordinating *The South Sudan Reconciliation, Stabilization and Resilience Trust Fund* (RSRTF, see chapter 3).

An understanding of the role and engagement of the UN mission in diverse areas like military engagement, peacebuilding, reconciliation, protection and Trust Fund management is crucial for conducting a Triple Nexus analysis in South Sudan. This is particularly significant considering the UN's substantial engagement in peace- and security-related matters (see the box below to understand the difference between these two terms).

Figure C.  
A woman digs holes as she begins the construction of a shelter in the internally displaced persons camp in Turalei, South Sudan.  
Source: Paul Jeffrey / Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe.

C



## Different logics of peace and security

The terms 'peace' and 'security' are often used interchangeably, but, according to Birckenbach (2012), it is essential to clearly differentiate both concepts.

1. Peace at its core is an inclusive concept ('peace *with* someone'), which is based on trustful relations.
2. Security at its core is an exclusive concept ('security *from* someone or something'), which is based on the defence against external threats.

Peace and security are both very important objectives, but they entail very different logics of action:

Peace: Building trustful relations – peacebuilding – includes a reflection about the own role and responsibility for existing problems, tensions or violence. By reducing violence and increasing justice and trustful relations, the 'logic of peace' can reduce perceived threats based on a long-term perspective.

Security: The defence against perceived threats typically locates the responsibility for the threat (and potential violence) externally. The 'logic of security' entails a high risk of escalation and takes a rather short-term perspective, while it is a basic human need and must be taken very seriously.

One way of balancing peace and security is to set the 'logic of peace' as the overarching principle, and to try to keep the 'logic of security' as narrow as possible in order to not exacerbate the initial problem.

## 3. The Triple Nexus in South Sudan – opportunities, capacities and risks

### 3.1. Civil society perspectives

In Western capitals, civil society actors often perceive the Triple Nexus as an initially UN and donor-driven agenda which often raises the question of whose interests it might serve. Interestingly, among civil society actors in South Sudan there is substantial support for a Triple Nexus approach both from local and international NGOs. "If there is no peace, we can't even work", said a South Sudanese NGO manager. "It is unavoidable to integrate peacebuilding and elements of resilience into the humanitarian response", remarked a staff member of an INGO. As the conflict is protracted, "it is a must to have this Nexus." Some international aid workers even underlined that "a peace component would be fantastic."

A push for more both local and international peace engagement as well as developmental engagement in South Sudan has been a common narrative in interviews. Local actors hardly associate the Triple Nexus with a Western agenda or a donor-driven policy following a security or migration policy-dominated framework. While more than 2.2 million South Sudanese have fled to neighbouring countries, it is neither a major origin of migration to Europe nor a migration hub. "We don't feel pressed towards the Nexus, so far it is rather a buzzword", an INGO Country Director indicated.

On the contrary, many local NGOs in South Sudan come from a Triple Nexus-oriented practice and tradition, and consider a peace-integrated approach as an obvious and pragmatic choice. A recent study on faith-based local actors in South Sudan highlights the latter's approach to have worked for many years in an integrated way on the community level targeting peace building, development goals and humanitarian issues at the same time. Only as they have internationalised, local actors have been asked by partners and donors to work in silos, leading to the implementation of humanitarian-only, development-only or peace-only projects. Now, to them the Triple Nexus is presented as a new trend proposing a way of working that many local actors have previously practiced. Therefore, many local actors appreciate the Nexus approach (Wilkinson, de Wolf, and Alier 2019, 14).

When speaking under condition of confidentiality, these local civil society views have also been mirrored by some authorities. Interviewees stated that "there is a need to integrate peacebuilding" in aid work, and they see the Triple Nexus as "an opportunity". Even an interviewee from a government authority advised to "listen to local people, not politicians" because "we have political people here who are very toxic" and who instrumentalise the local communities.

Even controversial challenges to the Triple Nexus such as the blurring of lines in particular between impartial humanitarian action and more political arenas, such as development and peace, are handled in a fairly pragmatic way in South Sudan. Surprisingly, in one of the most sensitive fields of interaction, civil-military cooperation, many local actors take a pragmatic approach. For example, in the POC sites humanitarian assistance is provided by all kinds of NGOs, including Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and German Welthungerhilfe, under permission and protection of UNMISS military.

As an INGO country director of an agency, which is internationally rather critical of the Triple Nexus, pointed out, "here in South Sudan is a different situation. We compromised on humanitarian principles but with no harmful impact on the humanitarian side so far." Comparing the country with settings like Somalia and Afghanistan he underlined that "there we had no UN relations at all, also for our own safety as they have been a target. Here we attend country team meetings hosted by OCHA and the Humanitarian Coordinator, share information and it is helpful for us."

As an example of fruitful cooperation, civil society actors shared the experience of effectively dealing with gender-based violence, a widespread problem in South Sudan. When a health-related INGO shared information of rapidly escalating numbers of abuse cases in one hospital, UNMISS substantially expanded patrols in the region and numbers went down rapidly.

The pragmatism of civil society actors is mirrored by a pragmatic multilevel role of UNMISS potentially blurring mandate lines by its broad activities in protection, peace, security, humanitarian and donor-related roles.

**"Here in South Sudan is a different situation. We compromised on humanitarian principles but with no harmful impact on the humanitarian side so far."**

“UNMISS  
is doing a lot of  
mediation work.”

### 3.2. The UN mission's role

For many aid practitioners the mixed roles of UNMISS in South Sudan is not very controversial. They consider UNMISS as strategically positioned, better resourced and more neutral than domestic institutions. UNMISS is neither officially a 'stabilisation mission' nor under suspicion of serving mainly Western security interests.

While due to UNMISS' major protection role, in particular in POC sites in the past, it has been considered at times as being rather “pro-opposition”. For civil society actors this is not a major issue today and most aid agencies cooperate with the mission. “UNMISS is doing a lot of mediation work”, an INGO staff member stated appreciatively. A government representative also added when guaranteed anonymity that “there is not much cooperation with the government, while the mission is seen as a protection force”, and the mission does “good work in this field”. Accordingly, analysts count on UNMISS as a credible player, for example, with respect to protection of opposition leaders in the capital Juba in times of ongoing peace deal negotiations (International Crisis Group 2019).

The UN mission has another specific role in South Sudan, as it is co-managing a relatively new fund, *The South Sudan Reconciliation, Stabilization and Resilience Trust Fund* (RSRTF). It has the objective “to provide strategic financing to integrated programmes that together lessen the destructive drivers of conflict and develop more peaceful and, ultimately, self-reliant communities.” It aims at durable intra- and inter-community reconciliation and stable environments in which communities can engage constructively on resilience. Through an area-based programming approach, the RSRTF brings together UN agencies, NGOs and UNMISS to collectively work with communities and is sometimes informally called “the UNMISS Fund”.

The fund consists of three essential elements which are there to lessen the destructive effects of the conflict and contribute to more self-reliant and peaceful communities:

**Reconciliation:** *Restore trust and support peaceful coexistence and social cohesion through gender and age sensitive communal conflict management, prevention, mitigation and reconciliation.*

**Stabilization:** *Deter violence, restore security, and reinforce the rule of law and equitable access to justice, supported by strategic use of existing peacekeeping capability.*

**Resilience:** *Invest in community capacities and resources and promote equality, agency and self-reliance to meet basic needs sustainably without reliance on external assistance.<sup>15</sup>*

Figure D.  
Hungry people eat leaves of the lalob tree in a camp for internally displaced people in Manangui, South Sudan.  
Source: Paul Jeffrey / Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe.



D



“Though donors put money into UNMISS hands, there is no relevant discussion about humanitarian principles.”

The general idea of the Triple Nexus is clearly articulated for the RSRTF:

“In South Sudan’s fluid and fragmented context, the notion of a linear continuum or transition from conflict and acute humanitarian need to reconciliation, recovery and development is unrealistic. The complementary elements supported by the Fund aim to enable more flexible and adaptive programming responsive to the inevitable shifting dynamics of the context, resulting in changeable sequencing and gradations of the three RSR elements over time as changing circumstances dictate.”<sup>16</sup>

RSRTF so far has allocated \$25.4 mio funded by the governments of Germany, Sweden and Norway, while key implementing partners are three UN organisations and five NGOs (see graphic).

“Though donors put money into UNMISS hands, there is no relevant discussion about humanitarian principles”, an INGO representative said. “NGOs are quite happy with the way the fund is handled”, another INGO leader indicated. Civil society actors are also represented in its consortium, and agencies appreciate its flexibility: “It is also a flexible approach to get out of the silos and pitching it you really need to hit all three areas.”


Another Triple Nexus and UN-related fund is *The Partnership for Recovery and Resilience* (PfRR), by which a group of donors, UN Agencies and NGOs aim at “working together to reduce vulnerability and increase the resilience of people, communities and institutions in South Sudan on their way to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.”<sup>17</sup> The PfRR framework highlights local ownership, a commitment to peace and recovery, and a conflict sensitivity “across the humanitarian-peace-development nexus/continuum in line with the ‘New Way of Working’”.<sup>18</sup>

As both initiatives are relatively new instruments, it needs to be seen how they materialise on the ground and how UNMISS’ role as a donor will evolve. Both RSRTF and PfRR focus on area-based programming, i.e. using not only needs-based criteria as humanitarian action should according to the principle of impartiality, as it has been criticised by some humanitarian actors.<sup>19</sup> At the same time INGOs apply for the funds, and these are often mentioned by civil society actors as practical expressions of the Triple Nexus in South Sudan. A view shared by operating UN agencies in South Sudan, which consider the Triple Nexus as a natural part of good programming if done in an appropriate way.<sup>20</sup>


Figure E.  
RSRTF at a glance.  
Source: 2019 Annual Report South Sudan  
Reconciliation, Stabilisation and  
Resilience Trust Fund.

# RSRTF at a glance



**\$14.4m**  
2019 Contributions




**\$25.4m**  
2018–2020 contributions



**3**  
Projects supported




**\$11.2m**  
Allocations



**8**  
Implementing organizations

**3 United Nations entities:** UNMISS, FAO, IOM  
**5 International NGOs:** World Relief, CARE, Mercy Corps, Danish Refugee Council and World Vision



The importance of local actors is recognised by international actors who are confident in the capabilities and experience of local actors in South Sudan.

### 3.3. Local capacities

Above a fairly broad agreement has been analysed that key actors in South Sudan see in principle potential for a fruitful Triple Nexus approach. But how does this correspond with local actors' capacities and respective roles?

While the UN's role is perceived as rather uncontroversial and supportive to peace efforts in the country, there is broad consensus that local actors are the basis for achieving peace in South Sudan on various levels of conflict. For humanitarian actors, "the key to peacebuilding is to work with local actors", as an INGO interviewee underlined. Local actors are crucial as they have the in-depth understanding and insights of specific local and conflict-related contexts. As another interviewee put it: "The three most important issues for aid programming are: context, context, context."<sup>21</sup>

The role of local (and in general domestic) actors has been in the focus of the 'localisation' debate in the humanitarian sector. Accordingly, for humanitarian actors there is a close link between localisation and peacebuilding. Local actors are closer to the people in need and to the relevant conflict parties (*proximity*). They can have different kinds and sometimes higher levels of credibility and legitimacy (for example, trust is particularly important for peacebuilding), and some of them can work on different levels of society, including the community level. Several interviewees pointed out that aid agencies cannot influence macro-level issues, but against this backdrop solutions must come from the community level.

The importance of local actors is recognised by international actors who are confident in the capabilities and experience of local actors in South Sudan. "In villages often structures are there, conflict mechanisms are there and its working", an INGO leader appreciated. "South Sudan has a history of strong NGOs, as INGOS did not have access", another INGO Country Director emphasized, "and once you get routine to work together, it is fine".

These views have also been confirmed by recent research focussing on faith-based actors in South Sudan (Wilkinson, de Wolf, and Alier 2019). Wilkinson et al. (2019) note that many local actors work in multi-sectoral, integrated programs, often incorporating humanitarian, development and peace activities that constitute the Triple Nexus approach. Many local actors are engaged in peacebuilding, including INGO-related bodies, such as the Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP). Examples of activities on the community level include training in alternative coping mechanisms for food security and in mediation to prevent cattle raids, as well as cash transfers which enable people to pay off their debts and reduce violent coping mechanisms (Wilkinson, de Wolf, and Alier 2019).

The crucial role of particularly faith-based actors in South Sudan has been underlined by further research regarding the macro-level of conflict as well as judgments from an operational perspective by interviewees. Thinking of a "religion-governance interface calls attention to the unique ways religious agency impacts the 'Peace-Humanitarian-Development Nexus'" in South Sudan and other African countries (Agensky 2019, 293; Moro 2015). Regarding the various levels of conflict, a representative of a non-faith-based INGO underlined: "International church agencies already work with domestic churches [...], and actors with such massive coverage like churches can influence this".

On the operational side, the substantial capacities and experience of faith-based actors have also been highlighted: “Catholic Relief Services, for example, is really well-based on local level, they know all counsellors, know who to invite, and do, for example, large cash programs in a very conflict-sensitive way”, an INGO Country Director praised, while highlighting the basis for such an impact: “They are there for 50 years and have tea with everybody every other day.”

Faith-based actors bring in an additional element to humanitarian action, development and peacebuilding, namely spiritual aspects of life and the need for spiritual support in all three sectors, “the other side of human being” (Wilkinson, de Wolf, and Alier 2019, 21). Spiritual aspects are particularly relevant in psychosocial responses in conflict-driven South Sudan and beyond, for example, to heal trauma.

However, while humanitarian-development, as well as development-peace programs take place to some extent, humanitarian-peace work is conceived by international actors to be most challenging, as humanitarian principles might be at odds with the potentially political nature of peacebuilding and the potential lack of neutrality of local actors. With respect to South Sudan, some interviewees indicated: “Groups are usually so rooted in specific ethnics or local roots that you always need to balance”, an INGO Country Director stressed. This can have also very practical impacts, an INGO staff member underlined: “To partner and work locally is a chance to build relations, while it comes with challenges”. Mere contracting relations can illustrate such challenges; as an NGO representative confessed, even tenders cannot always be done properly: “If a contractor from the West wins a tender for implementing a project in an Eastern region, we know before he won’t be able to do it, as he won’t be accepted”.

While this is a concern often raised well beyond the South Sudan context, for domestic actors the humanitarian principles might play a different role than for international ones (Schenkenberg 2018, 65–68): Humanitarian principles of independence and neutrality can also be seen as instruments to leverage access to people in need and achieve the principle of impartiality, which is often considered as the core of humanitarian action. If local actors have access and reach those most in need, the principle of neutrality might be less important (Slim 2020). For South Sudan, such an approach has been confirmed, for example, in interviews with both an INGO and a UN agency which consider that balancing partners with different allegiances could be a way of dealing with the principle of neutrality.

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**“The Triple Nexus is a good chance to combine efforts, and we should do much better on this. But we don’t have the expertise, we would not know where to start.”**

The potential of local-level capacities for a Triple Nexus in South Sudan can be further underlined when looking at the different levels of conflict: On the local community level, various kinds of peace initiatives can be identified, while conflicts on this level are impacted by but not fully dependent on the other conflict levels. At the same time, the community level is often not considered enough by donors and aid agencies. “People don’t look into those initiatives, although they can be more sustainable than on the macro level”, an INGO staff member stressed. For instance, such initiatives can lead to cooperation on an aid transportation crossline, agreements between chiefs or other reconciliation measures. Moreover, while aid organisations rarely influence the macro-level conflict, many aid workers agree that they should engage in peacebuilding at lower levels: “We have to work directly on it, otherwise we don’t create the necessary pressure [at the macro-level].”<sup>23</sup>

Aid practitioners point out additional links between the levels of conflict and the related Triple Nexus arenas in South Sudan: For example, as long as communities have sufficient resources (harvest, communal dams, etc.), the local mechanisms to deal with conflicts work rather well. But when basic means or services by the state are not provided, and result in pushing people to the brink of famine or extreme poverty, conflicts easily escalate. Therefore, “linking, for example, assistance with material resources and peacebuilding efforts” can gather substantial momentum in a Nexus-related way, if it is done in a sustainable and appropriate manner.<sup>24</sup>

## INGO capacities

A broad consensus on the substantial capacities and capabilities of local civil society actors and, in particular, faith-based actors in South Sudan for implementing a Triple Nexus approach has been outlined above. It needs to be noted that so far international NGOs do not match these profiles, though many consider a Triple Nexus approach an opportunity, if not a must in the country. One INGO even reported to having been approached by local partners to engage jointly in a Triple Nexus project but had to turn down the offer due to a lack of capacity.

“The Triple Nexus is a good chance to combine efforts, and we should do much better on this. But we don’t have the expertise, we would not know where to start”, an INGO Country Director admitted. Other INGOs confessed that even a dual Humanitarian-Development Nexus is by no means a programme reality. “Sometimes there are different components for different groups of people, but the projects themselves are either humanitarian or development”, another INGO representative explained. So, on the one hand, some Nexus-related projects can be identified, such as the World Food Programme (WFP) project combining local food purchases and infrastructure investments with a nutrition and food assistance programme. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) implements social cohesion projects as well as programmes combining livelihood support for conflicting farmers and pastoralists with community protection, educational radio programmes and reconciliation measures to prevent revenge killings. Similarly, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) combines educational programmes and vocational training with Community Conflict Resolution trainings.

On the other hand, overall a very self-critical narrative characterised the feedback by interviewees. A Western government agency admitted frankly: “Until 2016 we did not work very conflict sensitively, and only in 2018 we started peace work”. Having said that, ‘peace’ work in South Sudan and beyond may

need a closer examination. Some question its truly peace-related content due to a widespread pattern of re-labelling pre-existing activities. Some interviewees confirmed that a lot of “re-labelling” is taking place, highlighting for example that “every market opened in the country is now a ‘peace market’”.<sup>25</sup>

Moreover, the scope of operational UN agencies and their partly untapped potential has been emphasised with regard to the Triple Nexus. As an INGO Country Director put it, the WFP, for example, expands its conditional assistance by linking nutrition training with cash assistance, but the impact could be broader by joining forces with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) to link humanitarian support and agricultural output.

Even if one looks at the baseline of operations in conflict settings, to ensure conflict sensitivity and *Do No Harm* as guiding principles and tools, various interviewees admitted that “there is a lot of box ticking ongoing” versus real analysis.<sup>26</sup>

Moreover, most aid programmes in South Sudan are so far rather stuck in humanitarian efforts and even struggle to re-switch to development approaches, let alone to integrate peace efforts. While this is partially related to inflexible donor policies (see 3.4.), it needs to be noted that investments in know-how and staff capacities are needed. This is even more true as the South Sudan context also offers Triple Nexus-related potential with respect to facilities and know-how, as the issue of conflict sensitivity can shed light on (see box).

“There is a lot of box ticking ongoing.”


## Untapped capacity potentials - the example of Conflict Sensitivity

Humanitarian assistance or development assistance delivered in such a complex, highly contested and conflict-affected context like South Sudan is not only strongly influenced by conflict dynamics, but aid has an impact on those conflict dynamics as well. These impacts may be direct or indirect, intentional or unintended, and conflict easing or enforcing. Conflict sensitivity is an approach that helps humanitarian and development actors maximise the potential positive and minimise any potential negative impacts of their interventions on conflict (CSRF 2017). To deal with this challenge, a spectrum from a minimalist (avoiding harm) to a maximalist approach (addressing drivers of conflict) can be made use of:

Source: CSRF 2017, 6.

**Minimum standard as required by OECD DAC Fragile States Principles**

**Aspiration outlined in SDG 16 and New Deal**



**Minimalist**

**Maximalist**

Many organisations in South Sudan and beyond work with experienced staff and try to work in a way that is sensitive to ongoing conflicts. However, this research has confirmed that major international actors in the country (and in other CHA-researched contexts) lack a systematic, conflict sensitive approach, while without explicit analysis these actors can hardly know whether they are unintentionally doing harm or preventing the latter. When making it explicit, outcomes will often surface that an organisation was not aware of its both positive and harmful effects, so this effort can also lead to a confirmation of positive approaches. However, as a peace expert confirmed, “you’d be surprised how few organisations do it”.

At the same time, South Sudan offers substantial opportunities in this regard by partnerships as well as facilities for aid actors. For example, it could pay off substantially for the latter to make use of resources such as the *Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility* (CSRF).

CSRF is an institution initiated in 2016 to support the use of conflict sensitivity in donor strategies and programmes in South Sudan by common guidelines and principles, research and analysis, training and capacity building for donors and aid agencies, learning and best practices. The CSRF is implemented by the British NGO Saferworld and the research institute Swisspeace, and funded by the governments of UK, Switzerland, Canada and the Netherlands. It provides trainings and comprehensive organisational assessments of quality, for example, for WFP at the time of this research. As NGO practitioners confirmed: “They do very good papers and offer a six-months-mentorship”. At the same time, this research has identified civil society organisations who have neither made use of such resources, nor conflict sensitive approaches already in place.

Hardly any aid agency would argue against conflict sensitivity – and nobody did in the interviews. But putting it into practice in a systematic way can be hampered by high workloads, lacking continuity in volatile settings or rapid turnover of expats as in South Sudan. Human resources challenges, like the rapid turnover of expats, mean that capacity building within an organisation may tend to focus on hiring and training national staff to the extent possible. Individually, “conflict analysis is their daily life”,<sup>27</sup> which makes this an asset for an organisation, particularly if this task is identified as a priority, and as a separate one:

Conflict sensitivity experts do not recommend extending existing security analyses by regular security staff towards conflict sensitivity. They point out that understanding conflict dynamics and their interaction with aid activities is something very different to keeping staff and assets safe, as the concepts of peace and security are very different (see box above). “It tells you a lot when so-called conflict sensitive programme approaches of an INGO in fact only focus on the safety of their own assets and stuff”, as an INGO evaluator put it.



### 3.4. Risks

This research has so far highlighted aspects representing a substantial potential for a Triple Nexus approach in South Sudan, and the local call to move in this direction. At the same time, country-specific risks of implementing the Triple Nexus need to be noted, in particular with respect to its instrumentalisation.

Even if only a few aid actors pointed out the related risks, in the words of a conflict sensitivity expert, “the risk of instrumentalisation is the very definition of a complex political emergency”. “There is a history of such instrumentalisation”, the expert added, highlighting the example of the *Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)*,<sup>28</sup> which has been criticised for various reasons. “Some observers argue that the UN’s willingness to care for those displaced in and from the South meant that there was less incentive for the southern factions to resolve their differences and stop their own fighting than they might have had otherwise” (Maxwell, Santschi, and Gordon 2014, 5).

Moreover, by OLS negotiating and cooperating with southern rebel groups, the latter used this as legitimisation which contributed probably to their negotiating position. While many observers might consider the southern opposition’s cause resulting in independence a legitimate request in the former Sudan context, this impact of OLS ‘impartial’ humanitarian efforts remains a principle-related dilemma, as the strengthened negotiation position of the opposition might have prolonged the conflict (Maxwell, Santschi, and Gordon 2014, 5).

Today, there are several issues prone to a potential instrumentalisation of aid and humanitarian action in South Sudan. These include: the agreement on and implementation of borders of the new states; the cantonment of armed opposition groups; land issues (for example property rights of displaced people); the return and resettlement of displaced people (such as ethnic segregation).

Some interviewees also see deficits, for example, with regard to aid organisations involved in supporting people to leave POC sites, which could result in politically-driven “ethnic redistribution” if people are not allowed to return to their homes. Besides, a political push to move fast on POC resettlement programmes to showcase that the peace process is progressing has been named as an issue to closely monitor.

On the operational side, aid agencies named a few examples of a potential blurring of lines between principled humanitarian assistance and peace-related efforts. For example, an INGO representative reported that he has been asked to support former soldiers in need with food assistance and medical support. He declined this request. Others mentioned limited targeting or corruption in aid flows as a risk which can escalate conflicts. For example, in regions controlled by the opposition, INGOs have to pay twice – to the government and the opposition. Local chiefs sometimes feel very powerful and independent of Juba, and they often have substantial personal interests.<sup>29</sup>

“The risk of instrumentalisation is the very definition of a complex political emergency.”

**“This risk aversion to change programmes is not sensible, otherwise you feed them forever, which is the greatest risk.”**

On the flip side of the coin, an aversion to taking risks has also been named as a key issue. In particular, this is seen as an obstacle to dealing with INGOs and donors. Even if the Triple Nexus seems appealing for the South Sudanese context, several aid workers warned that there is more theoretical discussion than willingness to take the risks needed. “This risk aversion to change programmes is not sensible”, a UN representative stressed, “otherwise you feed them forever, which is the greatest risk”.

Both this UN agency as well as the vast majority of civil society actors closely linked this to another key risk: a lack of donor engagement, funding and flexibility. “There is no capacity whatsoever to deal with this. The conflict is still in full blow, and you are fooling yourself if you think you can influence this” with the given means, warned a UN representative.<sup>30</sup> This challenge of donor policies and engagement can be summarised as a donor paradox, which is not a singular issue in South Sudan, but manifests itself in various ways within the country.

## **Donor paradox**

Although donors have been pushing the Triple Nexus debate in South Sudan and beyond, aid workers criticise that aid funding is very limited, and it remains largely in silos.

In September 2020, the Humanitarian Response Plan for South Sudan had been funded by only a third for the same year,<sup>31</sup> while the needs were rising due to latest floods and Covid-19 impacts. At the same time, the political stalemate created another country-specific donor paradox for aid workers. On the one hand, the international community is in agreement that it is time to overcome a solely humanitarian response in times of fading conflict, which is why in particular humanitarian donors push for a shift. On the other hand, development donors are reluctant to engage as they do not see the necessary political conditions in place and decline to take the risks of failing programmes. This makes aid agencies trapped between the silos, with the humanitarian silo running out of stocks, while the development and peace silos refuse to open doors and budgets.

For example, the returns of IDPs from POCs to their home region has already been highlighted as a major issue in this regard. While humanitarian actors declined to fund the rehoming once they had left POCs, development donors refused to take over and hinted to the government’s responsibility for this “public job”. An INGO Country Director complained about the missed opportunities in these contexts, which would involve major peace elements due to social cohesion components for returnees and resettled South Sudanese. “This will create an emergency situation for years, and we are back to humanitarian support, which so far nobody is ready to fund.”

The issue of continuously siloed budgets makes South Sudan a cautionary tale for a concern which goes well beyond this country's Triple Nexus challenges. While donors push for integrated programmes and projects, few donor policies reflect a Dual or Triple Nexus related approach which would overcome funding silos (Poole and Culbert 2019). Leading donors like the European Commission and Germany remain largely stuck in institutional silos of separate budget lines, differing funding timelines and often quite different working cultures. Only a few donors like the UK and Sweden are at times appreciated as piloting more flexible approaches, with DFID being named in the South Sudan context as one of only a few donors linking resilience, recovery and peace aside of UNMISS and the related Trust Fund.

Views on other donor policies are straightforward: "At donor level things have to change", an INGO Country Director underlined, and various examples have been shared on the impact of siloed donor policies. "For example, regarding shelter for IDPs, which as expected needed to stay on for a long time, we tried from the beginning to provide building stuff, do cash for work and resilience measures", another INGO representative highlighted, "but on the donor side such transition stuff falls often in between". An implementing body of a Western government reported that work even stopped in 2017 in the middle of the conflict due to limited flexibility of budget lines.

In sum, in South Sudan, a triple donor paradox is identifiable. While donors keep pushing for a Triple Nexus approach, the same donors neither provide sufficient funding nor budget flexibility, and even a transition from a humanitarian to development effort is blocked. This multiple donor paradox is one of the greatest risks for a Triple Nexus approach in South Sudan. "We are trapped", as an INGO representative summarised.

**In South Sudan,  
a triple donor  
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is identifiable.**

## 4. Conclusion

The idea of the Triple Nexus, to link humanitarian action and development with peace, is relevant in the case of South Sudan. Moreover, the perspectives presented here provide key insights and lessons that are relevant beyond this case study.

The Triple Nexus concept is much less controversial in South Sudan than in other conflict settings like, for example, in Pakistan (Hövelmann 2020a) or in Mali (Steinke, forthcoming). The characteristics of the protracted crisis in South Sudan, its root causes and the long-standing experience with a pragmatic, integrated approach on a community level make the Triple Nexus an interesting approach which is requested by local actors.

While an integrated Triple Nexus approach by its nature poses risks of instrumentalising humanitarian action for other goals, humanitarian actors do not perceive the protection of humanitarian principles as a key obstacle in South Sudan.

International actors can learn from local actors, while long-term strategies for a shift from mostly humanitarian approaches to more development and peace-related programmes or partnerships are needed.

Moreover, the call for a more locally-led humanitarian action and the related localisation processes are further reasons to take the Triple Nexus idea seriously in this context, and both processes can reinforce each other on the various levels of conflict in South Sudan. Capacities of local NGOs, and the latter's traditionally integrated programming, provide potential for a Triple Nexus in the country.

International actors can learn from local actors, while long-term strategies for a shift from mostly humanitarian approaches to more development and peace-related programmes or partnerships are needed. Again, South Sudan provides potential for aid agencies, even if the latter's experience in the arena of conflict sensitivity and peace might be limited. Local peace actors, such as faith-based organisations, or facilities such as the CSRF, offer potential to expand aid programmes' impact to these fields, or to at least ensure conflict sensitivity and *Do No Harm* approaches. Moreover, limiting overall competition and expanding cooperation in these fields will be crucial for INGO actors.

In the first place, civil society actors may have limited impact on all three levels of conflict in South Sudan, and in particular NGOs can rather influence the community level. However, given the highlighted interlinkages of conflict levels in South Sudan, this can be a valuable contribution to impact higher levels, including the elites' conflict. It also has the potential to become a crucial element of a comprehensive approach which includes UN actors thanks to their relatively uncontested role in South Sudan.

In sum, a Triple Nexus approach in South Sudan provides substantial potential given that a series of criteria are met. Further CHA research has identified criteria as relevant to analyse in which local contexts a Triple Nexus can result in a helpful overcoming of silos, and where it might actually be counterproductive (Südhoff, Hövelmann, and Steinke 2020). With local ownership, local capacities, limited external security interests, a peace-oriented UN approach, and a supportive UN framework in place, South Sudan has the potential to become a concrete example of action in the so far rather abstract Triple Nexus debate.

However, this case study also sheds light on a globally-discussed challenge for making the Triple Nexus a meaningful approach: donor policies. Where donors are promoting a Triple Nexus approach, while keeping budget lines in silos, inflexible and short term, a Triple Nexus approach will not materialise. This is even more of an issue in South Sudan where donors are fading out humanitarian support while limiting development engagement for political reasons. Against the backdrop of an identified 'triple donor paradox', it will be seminal for South Sudan whether flexible approaches like the UNMISS Trust Fund and PfRR will further make progress and become a model for donor policies and if donor engagement can be sustained.

Therefore, to make the Triple Nexus effective in South Sudan, the very first challenge might be to prevent the country from becoming a forgotten crisis. In this sense, the Triple Nexus might also be an opportunity for South Sudan for another reason: as a vehicle to attract further international attention.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> For more background information on the Triple Nexus see: Hövelmann, Sonja. 2020. 'Triple Nexus to Go'. Berlin: Centre for Humanitarian Action.

<sup>2</sup> UN News. 2020. 'South Sudan: Progress on Peace Agreement "Limps along", UN Envoy Tells Security Council'. UN News. 16 September 2020. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/09/1072502>.

<sup>3</sup> UN News. 2020.

<sup>4</sup> XINHUA. 2020. 'Two Years after Signing Peace Deal, South Sudan Remains at Crossroads'. CGTN Africa (blog). 12 September 2020. <https://africa.cgtn.com/2020/09/12/two-years-after-signing-peace-deal-south-sudan-remains-at-crossroads/>.

<sup>5</sup> XINHUA. 2020.

<sup>6</sup> Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock — Briefing to the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in South Sudan, 2020 09 16, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Under%20Secretary-General%20for%20Humanitarian%20Affairs%20and%20Emergency%20Relief%20Coordinator%2C%20Mark%20Lowcock%20%E2%80%94%20Briefing%20to%20the%20Security%20Council%20on%20the%20humanitarian%20situation%20in%20South%20Sudan.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock — Briefing to the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in South Sudan, 2020 09 16.

<sup>8</sup> Statement of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General David Shearer Briefing to the Security Council on South Sudan, 2020 06 23, [https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/statement\\_by\\_the\\_srsrg\\_to\\_the\\_sc\\_-\\_final2.pdf](https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/statement_by_the_srsrg_to_the_sc_-_final2.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock — Briefing to the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in South Sudan, 2020 09 16.

<sup>10</sup> INGO interview.

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Security Council. 2011. 'Resolution 1996 (2011)'. S/RES/1996 (2011). <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/405/83/PDF/N1140583.pdf?OpenElement>.

<sup>12</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping. n.d. 'Troop and Police Contributors'. United Nations Peacekeeping. Accessed 13 October 2020. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.

<sup>13</sup> UNMISS. 2020. 'UNMISS "Protection of Civilians" (PoC) Sites Population Update, 12-18 June 2020'. 12 June 2020. [https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/poc-update\\_12\\_-\\_18\\_june\\_2020.pdf](https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/poc-update_12_-_18_june_2020.pdf).

<sup>14</sup> UNDP. n.d. 'South Sudan Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Reconciliation, Stabilization, Resilience'. Accessed 13 October 2020. <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/SSR00>.

<sup>15</sup> UNDP. n.d. 'South Sudan Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Reconciliation, Stabilization, Resilience'.

<sup>16</sup> UNDP. n.d. 'South Sudan Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Reconciliation, Stabilization, Resilience'.

<sup>17</sup> PfRR. n.d. 'Partnership for Recovery and Resilience (PfRR): Reduce Vulnerability, Enhance Resilience'. Accessed 19 October 2020. <https://www.southsudanpfrr.org/page/who-we-are>.

<sup>18</sup> Partnership for Recovery and Resilience. 2019. 'Partnership for Recovery and Resilience South Sudan: Framework'. <https://www.southsudanpfrr.org/sites/default/files/2019-12/PfRR%20Framework%20-%20V15.pdf>.

<sup>19</sup> Interview with a diplomat.

<sup>20</sup> Interviews with UN agencies in Juba.

<sup>21</sup> Interview with a donor representative.

<sup>22</sup> Interview INGO staff.

<sup>23</sup> Interview with an INGO representative.

<sup>24</sup> Interview INGO staff.

<sup>25</sup> Interview with a Western government agency.

<sup>26</sup> Interview with an NGO representative.

<sup>27</sup> Interview with a peace expert..

<sup>28</sup> Interview with a peace expert in Juba.

<sup>29</sup> NGO interview.

<sup>30</sup> Interview with a multilateral agency.

<sup>31</sup> Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock — Briefing to the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in South Sudan, 2020 09 16.

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